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Abstract We consider Nash-Cournot oligopolistic equilibrium models involving separable concave cost
functions. In contrast to the models with linear and convex cost functions, in these models a local
equilibrium point may not be a global one. We propose algorithms for finding global and local equilibrium
points for the models having separable concave cost functions. The proposed algorithms use the convex
envelope of a separable concave cost function over boxes to approximate a concave cost model with
an affine cost one. The latter is equivalent to a strongly convex quadratic program that can be solved
efficiently. To obtain better approximate solutions the algorithms use an adaptive rectangular bisection
which is performed only in the space of concave variables Computational results on a lot number of
randomly generated data show that the proposed algorithm for global equilibrium point are efficient for
the models with moderate number of concave cost functions while the algorithm for local equilibrium
point can solve efficiently the models with much larger size.
Keywords Nash-Cournot oligopolistic model · Concave cost · local, global equilibria · Gap function ·
Convex envelope · Adaptive rectangular bisection
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1 Introduction
The Nash- Cournot oligopolistic market model is one of fundamental models in economics that has been
earned attention of many authors, see e.g. [1,3,4,7,9,10,11] and the references cited therein. In this model
it is assumed that there are N -firms producing a common homogeneous commodity. Each firm i has a
strategy set Di ⊂ R+ and a profit function fi defined on the strategy set D := D1 × · · · × DN of the
model. Let xi ∈ Di be a corresponding production level of firm i. Actually, each firm seeks to maximize
its profit by choosing the corresponding production level under the presumption that the production of
the other firms are parametric input. A commonly used approach to this model is based upon the famous
Nash equilibrium concept.
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We recall that a point (strategy) x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
N ) ∈ D is said to be a Nash equilibrium point of
this Nash-Cournot oligopolistic market model if
fi(x
∗) ≥ fi(x
∗[xi]) ∀xi ∈ Di, ∀i,
where the vector x∗[xi] is obtained from x
∗ by replacing x∗i with xi.
In the linear Nash-Cournot model the profit function of firm i is given by
fi(x) = (α− β
N∑
j=1
xj)xi − hi(xi) (i = 1, . . . , N), (1)
where β > 0, α > 0 and, for every i, the cost function hi is affine that depends only on the quantity xi of
firm i. In this linear case, it has been shown that (see e.g. [9]) the model has a unique Nash equilibrium
point which is the unique solution of a strongly convex quadratic program. In the case hi is differentiable
convex, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium point can be formulated as a monotone variational
inequality [3,11] which can be solved by available methods for the monotone variational inequality.
In some practical applications, the cost for production of a unit commodity decreases as the quan-
tity of the production gets larger. The cost function then is concave rather than convex. Nash-Cournot
oligopolistic models with concave cost functions are considered in recent paper by Bigi and Passacantando
in [2]. For these models, as it is shown [14] that the problem can be formulated as a mixed variational
inequality of the form
Find x∗ ∈ D : 〈F (x∗), x− x∗〉+ ϕ(x)− ϕ(x∗) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ D.
In this problem F is not monotone and ϕ may not be convex, and therefore the existing methods for the
monotone variational inequality cannot be applied. In [14] an algorithm is proposed for finding a global
equilibrium point of the model when some of the cost functions are piecewise linear concave. However
the algorithm there is efficient only when the number of the piecewise linear concave cost functions is
relatively small. In [17] a proximal point method was described for finding a stationary point of the model.
However a stationary point may not be a global, even not a local equilibrium point.
In this paper we continue our work in [14] and [17] by considering Nash-Cournot models, where
some of the cost functions are separable concave, the remaining costs are affine. Namely we approximate
the model with concave cost functions by piecewise linear concave cost models that can be solved by an
existing Search-and-Check algorithm in [14]. Thanks to the fact that the strategy set is a rectangle (box)
and the cost functions are separable increasing, the model has particular features that can be employed
to develop efficient algorithms for solving it. We propose two algorithms: the first one is a search-check-
branch procedure that approximates the model with concave cost functions by the models with piecewise
linear concave functions. Thanks to the affine property of the price function and separability of the concave
cost function the latter models can be equivalently formulated as a strongly convex quadratic problem. In
order to obtain better approximate solutions the algorithm use an adaptive rectangular bisection which
is performed only in the space of the concave variables. The computational results on a lot number of
randomly generated data show that this algorithm are efficient for models with a medium number (≤ 40)
of the firms having concave cost functions, the number of total variables may be much larger. In order to
solve the models with larger number of the firms having concave cost functions we use again the convex
envelope of a concave function over a box to develop an algorithm for obtaining a local equilibrium point.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we define a gap function
that can serve as a stoping criterion for the algorithms. The third section is devoted to description of the
algorithms and analysis of their convergence. We close the paper with some computational results and
experiences.
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2 A Gap Function as a Stoping Criterion
In this section, we define a gap function for Nash-Cournot models involving concave cost functions. This
gap function will serve as a stoping criterion for checking whether a point is equilibrium or not. To be
precise, we consider the Nash- Cournot oligopolistic market model presented above under the assumption
that each profit function fj is defined by (1) where hj , j = 1, . . . , n with n ≤ N is increasing concave
while hi with i > n is increasing affine. This assumption is motivated by the fact that for some firms the
cost consists of both the production and transportation costs, while for the other ones, the production
need not to transport. In practice the transportation cost function is concave (see the example in [2]).
First, we define the bifunction φ by taking
φ(x, y) := 〈B˜1x− a, y − x〉+ y
TB1y − x
TB1x+ h(y)− h(x) (2)
where
a := (α, α, . . . , α)T ,
B1 :=


β 0 0 . . . 0
0 β 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 0 β

 , B˜1 :=


0 β β . . . β
β 0 β . . . β
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
β β β . . . 0

 ,
and we suppose that
h(x) :=
N∑
i=1
hi(xi).
Then the problem of finding an equilibrium point for the model can be formulated as a mixed variational
inequality problem MV(D) of the form (see e.g.[14]){
find a point x ∈ D such that
Φ(x, y) := 〈B˜1x− a, y − x〉+ ϕ(y)− ϕ(x) ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ D,
MV (D)
where ϕ(y) := yTB1y + h(y), ϕ(x) := x
TB1x + h(x). Clearly, ϕ is a DC separable function if each hi is
concave, in particular case, if each hi is affine, then ϕ is a separable strongly quadratic convex function.
In the latter case every local equilibrium point is global one and we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1 [9,14] Suppose that the cost function h is affine(classical model) given as h(x) := µTx + ξ.
Then variational inequality MV (D) can be equivalently formulated as the convex quadratic programming
problem
min{xT (2B1 + B˜1)x+ (µ− a)
T : x ∈ D}.
Gap functions are commonly used to determine stoping rules in optimization, variational inequality and
equilibrium problems as well as to reformulate them as a mathematical programming problem. Following
this idea, we now define a gap function for the Nash-Cournot equilibrium models with separable concave
cost functions. Namely, for Problem MV(D) we define a gap function by taking, for each x ∈ D,
g(x) := −min{Φ(x, y) : y ∈ D}. (3)
Lemma 2 Suppose that cost function hi is continuous on Di for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Then
(i) The function g(x) is well defined, continuous and g(x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ D;
(ii) A point x∗ ∈ D is equilibrium for the model if only if g(x∗) = 0.
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Proof. This lemma can be derived from Theorem 2.1 in [7]. Here we give a direct proof for MV(D).
(i) Since D is compact and, for each x ∈ D, Φ(x, .) is continuous on D, Φ(x, .) attains its minimum
on D. Further, from property Φ(x, x) = 0, it follows that g(x) ≥ 0 for every x ∈ D.
(ii) Suppose that x∗ ∈ D is an equilibrium point, then
Φ(x∗, y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ D,
which implies g(x∗) ≤ 0. Hence g(x∗) = 0. Conversely, if g(x∗) = 0, then from the definition of g(x∗) one
has Φ(x∗, y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ D, that means that x∗ is a equilibrium point of the model. 
Motivated by this lemma, we call a point xǫ an ǫ-equilibrium point if g(xǫ) ≤ ǫ.
We rewrite the bifunction Φ as
Φ(x, y) = 〈B˜1x− a, y − x〉+ β
N∑
i=1
y2i +
N∑
i=1
hi(yi)− β
N∑
i=1
x2i −
N∑
i=1
hi(xi),
the gap function g then can be rewritten as
g(x) = −min
y∈D
{
〈B˜1x− α, y − x〉+ β
N∑
i=1
y2i +
N∑
i=1
hi(yi)
}
+ β
N∑
i=1
x2i +
N∑
i=1
hi(xi) (4)
Since D is the box of the form
D := {xT = (x1, . . . , xN ) : 0 ≤ li ≤ xi ≤ ui, i = 1, . . . , N}
we can further write g(x) as
g(x) = −
N∑
i=1
min
li≤yi≤ui
{
(B˜1x− α)i(yi − xi) + βy
2
i + hi(yi)
}
+ β
( N∑
i=1
xi
)2
+
N∑
i=1
hi(xi).
(5)
A simple arrangement using (5) yields
g(x) = −
N∑
i=1
min
li≤yi≤ui
{
βy2i +
(
βσ(−i)(x) − α
)
yi + hi(yi)
}
+ β
( N∑
i=1
xi
)2
− αTx+
N∑
i=1
hi(xi),
(6)
where σ(−i)(x) :=
∑N
j 6=i xj . From (6) it follows that evaluating g(x), for each x ∈ D, one needs to solve
N -optimal problems each of them is one-variable minimization problem of the form
min
li≤yi≤ui
{
βy2i +
(
βσ(−i)(x)− α
)
yi + hi(yi)
}
, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (7)
In order to compare the Cournot model presented above with existing models let us consider the Bertrand
model. In a Bertrand model the firms producing a common homogenous commodity. In contrast to the
Cournot model, here each firm sets prices rather than the production quantity. So, in such a model, the
demand is a function of price.and the customers buy from firms with lowest price. However, often this
assumption is not realistic, since usually the products of the firms are not entirely interchangeable, and
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thus some consumers may prefer one product to the other even it costs somewhat more.
Suppose that the quantity level xi produced by firm i depends on the price and given by
xi(p) = γi − σipi +
n∑
j 6=i
λijpj , i = 1, . . . , n
where γi, σi > 0, λij ≥ 0 if (j 6= i). The condition σi > 0 means that the demand for firm i decreases
as its price increases, while λij ≥ 0. (i 6= j) means that the demand for firm i increases when other firms
increase their price.
The profit function of firm i then is given as
fi(p) := pixi − hi(xi),
where, following [2], we assume that the cost hi(.) is a concave function of the production level and is
given by
hi(xi) = νixi − dix
2
i with di ≥ 0.
Then an elementary computation shows that the cost is a function of the price as
hi(p) = −diσ2i p
2
i + σi
[
2di
(
γi +
∑n
j 6=i λijpj
)
− νi
]
pi + νi
(
γi +
∑n
j 6=i λijpj
)
−di
(
γi +
∑n
j 6=i λijpj
)2
The profit function then takes the form
fi(p) = σi(diσi − 1)p
2
i +
[
σiνi + (γi +
∑n
j 6=i λijpj)(1− 2diσi)
]
pi
+di
(
γi +
∑n
j 6=i λijpj
)2
− νi(γi +
∑n
j 6=i λijpj)
Each firm i attempts to maximize its profit by choosing a corresponding price level on its strategy
set [0, Ti] by solving the optimization problem
fi(p) = max
yi∈[0,Ti]
fi(p[yi])), ∀i = 1, . . . , n,
where p[yi] is the vector obtained from p by replacing pi with yi.
By the same technique as in the Nash-Cournot model the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium
point of this Bertrand model can be formulated as a mixed variational inequality of the form
Find p ∈ T := T1 × . . .× Tn : Φ(p, y) := 〈Gp− y, p− y〉+ ψ(y)− ψ(p) ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ T
where
G =


0 λ12(1− 2d1σ1) . . . λ13(1− 2d1σ1) λ1n(1− 2d1σ1)
λ21(1− 2d2σ2) 0 . . . λ23(1− 2d2σ2) λ2n(1− 2d2σ2)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
λn1(1− 2dnσn) . . . . . . λn,n−1(1− 2dnσn) 0


with
ri = γi(1− 2diσi), i = 1, . . . , n,
ψ(y) =
∑n
i=1 σi(diσi − 1)y
2
i ,
So as the Nash-cournot model, the Bertrand model can be formulated as a mixed variational inequality
MV (D). Note that since σi(diσi − 1), i = 1, . . . , n may be negative, the function ψ(.) may not convex.
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3 An Algorithm for Global Equilibria
In this section we describe an algorithm for approximating a global equilibrium point of the model.
The idea of the proposed algorithm is quite natural, it uses the convex envelope of the concave cost
function to approximate the original model with the one having piecewise linear concave costs. The latter
can be solved by an algorithm developed in [14] to obtain an approximate equilibrium point x. Then
by evaluating the gap function we can check whether or not the obtained point x is an ǫ-equilibrium
point. If not, we use an adaptive rectangular bisection to get a better approximate point. Thanks to the
rectangular structure of the strategy set and separability of the cost function, the proposed algorithm
can be implemented easily.
3.1 A Search-Check-Branch Algorithm
First we recall [8] that the convex envelope of a function ϕ on a convex set C is the convex function on
C, denoted by coC ϕ such that coC ϕ(x) ≤ ϕ(x) for every x ∈ C, and if ξ is any convex function on C
satisfying ξ(x) ≤ ϕ(x) for every x ∈ C, then ξ(x) ≤ coC ϕ(x) for every x ∈ C. It is well known [8] that
the convex envelope of a concave function is affine, and that if C = C1 × . . . × CN is compact and ϕ is
separable, i.e., ϕ(x1, . . . , xN ) =
∑N
j=1 ϕj(xj) then coϕ(x) =
∑N
j=1 coϕj(xj) where coϕj is the convex
envelope of ϕj over Cj . Clearly, since hi, i > n is affine, hi ≡ cohi on every convex set.
The algorithm we are going to describe is a search-check-branch procedure. For a given tolerance
ǫ ≥ 0, at each iteration, the algorithm consists of three steps. The search-step requires solving convex
quadratic programs for the approximate model with piecewise linear concave cost functions to obtain
an approximate equilibrium point. The check-step uses the gap function presented in the preceding
section to check whether the obtained solution is an ǫ- equilibrium point or not yet. The branch-step
employs an adaptive rectangular bisection performed in the space of concave variables to obtain a better
approximation for the model.
To be precise, suppose that the strategy set D := D1 × · · · ×DN . Let
I0 := D1 × . . .×Dn, J
0 := Dn+1 × · · · ×DN .
For a n-dimensional subbox I ⊆ I0, define
DI := {x
T := (x1, . . . , xN ) : (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ I, (xn+1, . . . , xN ) ∈ J
0} (8)
and consider the convex mixed variational inequality CMV(DI) defined as
Find xDI ∈ DI such that:
〈B˜1xDI − α, y − xDI 〉+ yTB1y + coI h(y) +
∑N
j=n+1 hj(y)
−(xTB1xDI + coI h(xDI ) +
∑N
j=n+1 hj(x
DI )) ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ DI .
In what follows we write xDI = (xI , xJ ) with xI ∈ I, xJ ∈ J0.
Since coI h(.) is affine, by Lemma 1, this problem is reduced to the strongly convex quadratic
program
min
x∈DI
{xTQx+ (cI)Tx}, (QDI)
where Q :=
1
2
B˜1 +B1, c
I = (cI1 , . . . , cIN )T with cIj := (aIj − α)(j = 1, 2, . . . , N).
Suppose that each strategy set Dj ( j = 1, . . . , n) has been divided into interval Dj,1, . . . , Dj,kj on
each of them the cost function is affine. Let ∆ be the set of n-dimensional subboxes defined as
∆ := {B := I1 × · · · × In : Ij ∈ {Dj,1, . . . , Dj,kj}, j = 1, . . . , n}.
Algorithms for finding global and local equilibrium points of Nash-Cournot equilibrium models involving concave cost 7
Define Σ as the family of N -dimensional subboxes by taking
Σ := {I = B × J0 : B ∈ ∆}.
Let us define the gap function for the model with piecewise concave cost function, that is
g¯(x) := −min
y∈D
φ¯(x, y) (9)
where
φ¯(x, y) := 〈B˜1x− a, y − x〉+ y
TB1y − x
TB1x+ h¯(y)− h¯(x)}, (10)
where h¯ is the piecewise linear concave function obtained by taking the convex envelope of h on each
element of Σ.
Note that, since hi is affine on Di for every i = n + 1, . . . , N , the convex envelope of hi on any
subbox coincides with hi for every i = n+ 1, . . . , N . In particular, coD h is affine and
co
D
h(x) =
n∑
j=1
co
I0
hj(x) +
N∑
i=n+1
hi(x).
First we briefly describe the algorithm in [14] as follows.
Algorithm 1 (Search-and-Check). Choose a tolerance ǫ ≥ 0.
Step 1: Select a subbox I ∈ Σ.
Step 2: Solve the strongly convex quadratic problem (QDI) to obtain its unique solution x
DI .
Step 3:
a) If g¯(xDI ) ≤ ǫ, terminate: xDI is an ǫ-equilibrium point for piecewise concave cost model.
(b) If g¯(xDI ) > ǫ and Σ = ∅, then terminate: the model has no equilibrium point. Otherwise, replace
Σ by Σ \ {I} and return to Step 1.
It is obvious that in the worst case, the algorithm searches all subboxes in Σ, however the compu-
tational results reported in [14] show that by using the gap function, in general, the algorithm finds an
ǫ- equilibrium point without searching all elements of Σ.
Using Algorithm 1 described above we can develop an algorithm for approximating an equilibrium
point of the model where some of the cost functions are concave. The idea is quite natural. In fact, at each
iteration we use the convex envelope of the concave cost function to obtain a model with piecewise lineae
concave cost function to which we can apply the search-and-check Algorithm 1 to obtain an approximate
equilibrium point. If the obtained point is not yet an ǫ- equilibrium point, we use an adaptive rectangular
bisection (Rule 1 below) to reduce the difference between the concave function and its convex envelope
to obtain a better approximate equilibrium point for the original model, and so on.
An adaptive rectangular bisection (Rule 1). Let I be a given n-dimensional subbox of D1× . . .×Dn.
For xI ∈ I, define
jmax := argmax
1≤j≤n
{hj(x
I
j )− cohj(x
I
j )}.
Then we bisect I into two boxes via the middle point of edge Ijmax . We call this middle point the bisection
point and jmax the bisection index.
For this bisection we have the following lemma whose proof can be found, e.g., in [12,13].
Lemma 3 Let {Ik} be an infinite sequence of boxes generated by the adaptive rectangular bisection Rule
1 such that Ik+1 ⊂ Ik for every k. Let bk be the bisection point and jk be the bisection index for Ik. Then
limk→∞(hjk(b
k)− coIk hjk(b
k)) = 0. Consequently, {Ijk} tends to a singleton. provided hjk is (concave)
not affine on Ijk for every jk.
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For each subbox I having n-edges Ij (j = 1, . . . , n) we define
ρ(Ij) := max
t∈Ij
{hj(t)− cohj(t)}
and
ρ(I) := max{ρ(Ij) :  = 1, . . . , n}. (11)
The algorithm now can be described as follows:
Algorithm 2 (Search-Check-Branch for global equilibria).
Initial step. Choose a tolerance ǫ ≥ 0, take the initial box I0 := D1 × . . .×Dn. Solve the convex mixed
variational inequality CMV(D) defined as
Find x ∈ D : Φ0(x, y) := 〈B˜1x− a, y − x〉+ y
TB1y − x
TB1x+ co
D
h(y)− co
D
h(x) ≥ 0∀y ∈ D,
which is equivalent to the strongly convex quadratic program (QDI0) to obtain its unique solution u
0.
Let Σ0 := {I
0}. x0 := u0.
Iteration k (k = 0, 1 . . .)
At the beginning of each iteration k we have:
• Σk: a finite family of n-dimensional subboxes of I0;
• uk = (uk1 , uk2) with uk1 ∈ I0, uk2 ∈ J0, the equilibrium point of the model with piecewise linear
concave function;
• xk ∈ D: the currently best feasible point, i.e., g(xk) is smallest among the obtained feasible points
so far.
Step 1.
a) If g(xk) ≤ ǫ, terminate: xk is an ǫ-equilibrium point of the original model.
b) If g(xk) > ǫ, choose Ik ∈ Σk such that
ρ(Ik) = max{ρ(I); I ∈ Σk}.
Step 2. Use the bisection Rule 1 described above to bisect Ik into two boxes Ik
+
and Ik
−
. Let jk be the
bisection index for Ik.
Step 3. Solve the strongly convex quadratic program (QDI) with I = I
k− and I = Ik
+
to obtain xk+
and xk− respectively.
Step 4. If either g(xk+) ≤ ǫ or g(xk−) ≤ ǫ, terminate.
Otherwise, update xk, Σk and the linear piecewise concave cost function by taking respectively
xk+1 ∈ {xk, xk+, xk−} such that g(xk+1) = min{g(xk), g(xk−), g(xk+)},
Σk+1 = (Σk \ {I
k}) ∪ {Ik
−
, Ik
+
}.
Step 5. Compute the convex envelope of function hjk on the egde jk of the subboxes I
k− , Ik
+
, thereby
to obtain the new approximation bifunction
Φk+1(x, y) := 〈B˜1x− a, y − x〉+ y
TB1y − x
TB1x+ co
k+1
h(y)− co
k+1
h(x),
where cok+1 h is the convex envelope of h obtained by replacing the convex envelope of hjk on the edge
jk of I
k by the convex envelope of hjk on the edge jk of I
k− and Ik
+
. Then use Algorithm 1 with the just
obtained piecewise linear concave cost function to solve the newly approximated piecewise linear concave
model to obtain uk+1.
Increase k by one and go to Step 1 of iteration k.
Suppose that every model with piecewise linear concave cost function has an ǫ- equilibrium point for any
ǫ > 0. Then we have the following convergence result.
Convergence Theorem.
(i) If the algorithm terminates at iteration k then xk is an ǫ-equilibrium point.
Algorithms for finding global and local equilibrium points of Nash-Cournot equilibrium models involving concave cost 9
(ii) If the algorithm does not terminate, it generates an infinite sequence {xk} such that any its
cluster point is an equilibrium point whenever the model has an equilibrium point. Furthermore g(xk)ց 0
as k →∞.
Proof. The statement (i) is obvious.
To prove statement (ii) we suppose that the algorithm never terminates. Let x∗ be any cluster point of
{xk}. Then there exists a subsequence of {xkq} that tends to x∗. Thus the corresponding sequence of
selected intervals has a nested sequence, which, by taking a subsequence if necessary, we denote also by
Ikq . Since Ikq is the box to be bisected at iteration kq, by Lemma 3, {Ikq} tends to a singleton, which
implies that hjq (xjq )− cohjq (xjq )→ 0 as q → ∞ (jq is the bisection index at iteration kq). By the rule
for selecting the bisection index, we have hj(xj)− cohj(xj)→ 0 for every j. Since ukq is an equilibrium
point of the model with piecewise linear concave cost function, we have g¯kq (u
kq ) = 0 for every q, where
g¯kq is the gap function for the piecewise linear concave cost model at iteration kq. By the definition of
the gap function g for the original model and of g¯ for the approximate model, and the rule for selecting
bisection index, we can write
g¯(ukq )− 2σkq ≤ g(u
kq ) ≤ g¯(ukq ) + 2σkq ∀q.
Letting q →∞, since σkq → 0, u
kq → u∗, by continuity of g, we obtain g(u∗) = 0.
On the other hand, since xkq is the currently best feasible point obtained at iteration kq, we have
0 ≤ g(xkq ) ≤ g(ukq ). Letting q → ∞, by continuity of g, we obtain 0 ≤ g(x∗) = g(u∗) = 0, which
means that x∗ is an equilibrium of the model. Note that, since xk is the currently best feasible point
obtained at iteration k, by definition, the sequence {g(xk)} is nonincreasing. Since the whole sequence
{xk} is bounded, it has a subsequence {xkj} converging to some x¯. Then, as we just have shown, x¯ is an
equilibrium point which implies g(x¯) = 0. Then the whole sequence {g(xk)} tends to 0 as well. 
Remark 1 In order to save the memory, we may use a criterion to delete every subbox that does not
contain an equilibrium point in it.
The following lemma gives a criterion that can be used to check whether a subbox contains an equilibrium
point or not. In fact, for a subbox DI := {x ∈ D : lI ≤ x ≤ uI}, let us define the numbe
g˜(DI) := − min
y∈DI
{〈B˜1u
I − a, y〉+ yTB1y + h(y)} − (l
I)TB1l
I + aTuI − h(lI).
Then we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4 Suppose xDI is an optimal solution of Problem (QDI).
(i) If coI h(x
DI ) = h(xDI ) then xI is the equilibrium point the model restricted on DI .
(ii) If g˜(DI) > 0, the subbox DI contains no equilibrium point of the model.
Proof.
(i) Since xDI is the solution of (QDI), we have
〈B˜1x
DI − a, y − xDI 〉+ yTB1y + co
I
h(y)− (xI)TB1x
DI − co
I
h(xDI ) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ DI .
Note that h(y) ≥ coI h(y), ∀y ∈ DI , by the assumption, coI h(x
DI ) = h(xDI ), we obtain
〈B˜1x
DI − a, y − xDI 〉+ yTB1y + h(y)− (x
I)TB1x
DI − h(xDI ) ≥ 0
for every y ∈ DI , which means that xDI is the equilibrium point the model restricted on DI .
(ii) We now prove that g(x) > 0 for all x ∈ DI . Indeed, by definition
Φ(x, y) = 〈B˜1x− a, y〉+ y
TB1y + h(y)− x
TB1x+ a
Tx− h(x).
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Since y ≥ 0, B˜1 and B1 are non-negative matrices, hi(.)(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) are increasing functions and
lI ≤ x ≤ uI for every x ∈ DI , we can write, for every y ∈ D and x ∈ DI ,
Φ(x, y) = 〈B˜1x− a, y〉+ y
TB1y + h(y)− x
TB1x+ a
Tx− h(x)
≤ 〈B˜1u
I − a, y〉+ yTB1y + h(y)− (l
I)TB1l
I + aTuI − h(lI).
(12)
By the definition of g˜(DI), it follows from (12) that
g(x) := −min
y∈D
φ(x, y)) ≥ − min
y∈DI
φ(x, y)) ≥ g˜(DI) > 0 ∀ x ∈ DI ,
which implies that DI does not contain an equilibrium point. 
4 An Algorithm for Local Equilibria
Using the fact that a point x∗ ∈ D is an equilibrium point of the model if and only if the gap function
g(x∗) = 0, we say that a point x¯ is a local equilibrium point of the model if there exists an open set
B ⊂ D such that x¯ ∈ B, gB(x¯) = 0, where gB stands for the gap function of the model restricted on
B. Note that because of concavity of the cost function, in this equilibrium Nash-Cournot model, a local
equilibrium point may not be a global one.
In this section, we propose an algorithm for approximating a local equilibrium point of the model
by using again the gap function.
Namely, for a subbox
I := {x = (x1, . . . , xn)
T : li ≤ xi ≤ ui, i = 1, . . . , n},
let, as before,DI be the subbox ofD consists of all points x
T = (x1, . . . , xn, . . . , xN ) such that (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
I. That is
DI = {x = (x1, . . . , xN )
T , li ≤ xi ≤ ui, i = 1, . . .N}.
Then define the gap function gDI restricted on DI by taking
gDI (x) = −
N∑
i=1
min
li≤yi≤ui
{
βy2i +
(
βσ(−i)(x) − α
)
yi + hi(yi)
}
+ β
N∑
i=1
x2i − a
Tx+
N∑
i=1
hi(xi),
(13)
where σ(−i)(x) :=
∑N
j 6=i xj . As before we use the convex envelope of the concave function h on each
subbox DI to obtain a convex mixed variational inequality whose solution can be obtained by solving
a strongly convex quadratic over DI . If it happens that at the obtained solution the values of the cost
function and its convex envelope on DI coincide, this solution is a local equilibrium point of the model.
Otherwise we bisect I to reduce the difference between the cost function and its convex envelope on DI .
Note that if gDI (x) = 0 for some x ∈ DI , then x is a local equilibrium point. Thus, if x ∈ DI and
gI(x) ≤ ǫ, then x is an ǫ-local equilibrium point. Since xDI is the equilibrium point of the model with
respect to DI , from the definitions of the convex envelope of h and the gap function restricted on DI ,
it follows that h(xDI ) − coI h(xDI ) = 0 implies gDI (x
DI ) = 0. The algorithm now can be described as
follows.
Algorithm 3 (Search-Check-Branch for local equilibria). Initial step. Choose tolerances ǫ > 0 and solve
Problem (QD) to obtain its optimal solution xI
0
.
Compute ρ0 := ρ(I
0) and ǫ0 := gD(x
I0). Set the initial box I0 and let Γ0 := {I0}.
Iteration k (k = 0, 1, . . .). At the beginning of each iteration k we have:
• Γk: a finite family of n-dimensional subboxes of I
0;
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• ǫk = min{gDI (x
DI ) : I ∈ Γk}, where xDI is the optimal solution of the convex quadratic program
(QDI);
Step 1. (Stoping criteria) If ǫk ≤ ǫ, terminate: xDI with ǫk = gDI (x
DI ) is an ǫ-local equilibrium point.
Step 2. (Selection) Choose Ik ∈ Γk such that
ρk := ρ(I
k) = max{ρ(I) : I ∈ Γk}.
Step 3. (Bisection): Divide the subbox Ik into two subboxes Ik
+
and Ik
−
by the bisection Rule 1.
Step 4. Solve the strongly convex quadratic programs (QDI) with I := I
k+ and I := Ik
−
to obtain the
optimal solutions xk
+
and xk
−
respectively. Compute ρ(Ik
+
) and ρ(Ik
−
).
Step 5. Let ǫk+1 := argmin{ǫk, gDI (x
DI ) with I = Ik
−
and I = Ik
+
}.
Step 6. (Updating) If g(xDI ) > 0 delete I from further consideration.
Let Γk+1 be the remaining set. If Γk+1 = ∅, terminate: the model has no ǫ-local equilibrium point.
Otherwise, go to iteration k with k := k + 1.
Convergence. The algorithm terminates after a finite iteration yielding an ǫ- local equilibrium point
whenever it does exist.
The proof of this convergence result is evident because of the fact that ǫ > 0, that the sequence of
selected boxes tends to a singleton and that the gap function is continuous.
Remark 2 If for every i, the cost function hi satisfies the condition
∇2hi(yi) ≥ −2βi ∀yi ∈ Di. (14)
Then the model admits a solution.
Indeed, for each x ∈ D, let Hi(x) be the solution set of the problem
min
yi∈Di
{
ϕi(x−i, yi) := βy
2
i +
(
β
N∑
j 6=i
xj − αi
)
yi + hi(yi)
}
. (QDi(x)).
It is easy to check that condition (14) ensures that the object function of this problem is convex in yi. Thus
Hi(x) is a closed convex of the interval Di. Since the objective function of this problem is continuous and
the feasible is compact, the solution set Hi(x) is a upper semicontinuous mapping from D into itself, by
well-known Kakutani fixed point, the mapping H(x) := H1(x)× . . .×HN (x) has a fixed point x
∗, which
is also an equilibrium point of the model.
Note that both the cost functions
hi(yi) = ℓiyi − diy
2
i
with βi > di > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. used in [2] and
hi(yi) = µiyi + ln(1 + γiyi),
with γi > 0 and γ
2
i ≤ 2βi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n satisfy condition (14).
5 Computational Results and Experiments
The proposed two algorithms were implemented in MATLAB. The programs were executed on a PC
Core 2Duo 2*2.0 GHz, RAM 2GB. We tested the program on different groups of problems, each of them
contains ten problems of different sizes N and n, but having randomly generated input data. Namely, for
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each problem, the numbers α, β, µi (i = n + 1, . . . , N) are randomly generated in the interval [20.30],
[0.001, 0.005] and [10.20] respectively. We take the cost functions of the form
hj(xj) = ajxj + ln(1 + γjxj), (j = 1, . . . , n), hi(xj) := µixi (i = n+ 1, . . . , N). (15)
where γj and aj are randomly generated in [7, 15] and [2, 7] respectively. The strategy set of firm i is
Di := [0, ui] where each ui is randomly generated in the interval [100.500].
The obtained results are reported in Table 4.1 below, where we use the following headings:
– N : number of the firms;
– n: number of the firms having concave (but not affine) cost;
– Average time: the average time (in second) needed to solve one problem;
– Average iter: the average numbers of iterations for one problem.
– Glob-GSCB: number of problems for which an equilibrium point was obtained by Search-Check-Branch
Algorithm for global equilibria.
– Glob-LCB: number of problems for which a global optimal solution was obtained by Search-Check-
Branch for local equilibria.
Size GSCB-Alg. LSCB-Alg.
N n Average
time
Average
iter.
Glob-
GSCB
Average
time
Average
iter
Glob-
LSCB
5 5 0.00 1 10 0.03 1 10
50 5 8.98 133 10 0.06 1 10
100 5 17.89 171 10 0.18 2 8
200 5 1.78 7 10 0.29 2 8
10 10 9.65 308 10 0.05 1 8
50 10 82.35 1141 10 0.22 4 4
100 10 47.05 445 10 0.43 5 7
200 10 41.06 203 10 0.33 2 7
20 20 127.15 2478 10 1.29 24 1
50 20 98.10 1231 10 0.50 7 3
100 20 105.00 914 10 1.72 16 3
200 20 440.88 2216 10 1.94 11 5
30 30 286.57 3754 10 0.89 13 2
50 30 246.44 2901 10 1.23 17 1
100 30 872.27 7193 10 0.73 7 2
200 30 750.72 3514 10 2.70 15 4
40 40 515.10 5944 10 3.09 40 2
50 40 1332.10 14820 9 7.69 97 0
100 40 646.53 5213 10 2.85 26 0
200 40 898.09 4169 9 3.83 21 1
100 100 Skip - - 20.21 148 0
200 100 Skip - - 132.64 568 0
200 200 Skip - - 107.63 400 0
300 200 Skip - - 252.67 579 0
Table 4.1
From the obtained results reported in Table 4.1 we can conclude the followings for the tested concave
cost functions given as (15).
• Algorithm 2 for global equilibrium point can solve models with a moderate number (n ≤ 40) of
concave cost functions, while Algorithm 3 can solve models where the number of concave cost functions
much larger.
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• For models where the number of the firms having concave cost is somewhat large (n ≥ 40), the
local equilibrium point obtained by the local algorithm is often not a global one.
6 Conclusion
A Nash-Cournot oligopolistic equilibrium model involving concave cost functions may have local equilib-
rium points that are not global ones. We have approximated such a model with the one having piecewise
linear concave function by using the convex envelope of a separable concave function over a box. Based
upon this approximation we have proposed two algorithms for approximating a global as well as local
equilibrium points that employ a gap function as a stoping criterion for the algorithms, and an update
rectangular bisection to make the approximation better. Some computational results have been reported
showing efficiency of the proposed algorithms for models where the number of the concave (but not affine)
cost functions is not large (n ≤ 40) for global algorithm, and (n ≤ 200) for local one. An open question
that would be interesting for further consideration is to find a differentiable gap function, for which a
local optimization algorithms such as descent ones in [6] or DCA in [16] could be applied efficiently.
Acknowledgements
This work is supported by the National Foundation for Science and Technology Development (NAFOS-
TED), Vietnam.
References
1. Aussel D., R. Correa R., Marechal M.: Gap functions for quasivariational inequalities and generalized Nash equilibrium
problems. J. Optim. Theory Appl. DOI 10.1007/s10957-011-9898-z
2. Bigi G., Passacantando M.: Differentiated oligopolistic markets with concave cost functions via Ky Fan inequalities.
Technical Report, Universita a di Pisa Dipartimento di Informatica. January 2017
3. Facchinei, F., Pang, J.S.: Finite-Dimensional Variational Inequalities and Complementary Problems. Springer, Berlin
(2002)
4. Facchinei F., Kanzow C.: Generalized Nash equilibrium problems. Annals of Operations Research 175, 177-211 (2010)
5. Fukushima M.: A class of gap functions for quasi-variational inequlity problems. J. of Industrial and Management
Optimization 3, 165-174 (2007)
6. Fukushima M.: Equivalent differentiable optimization problems and descent methods for asymmetric variational in-
equality problems. Math. Prog. 53, 99-110 (1992).
7. Fukushima M.,Pang J. S.: Quasi-variational inequality, generalized Nash equilibria, and multi-leader-folower games.
Computational Management Science 2, 21-26 (2005)
8. Horst, R., Tuy, H.: Global Optimization (Deterministic Approach). Springer, Berlin (1990)
9. Konnov, I.V.: Combined Relaxation Methods for Variational Inequalities. Springer, Berlin (2001)
10. Kubota K., Fukushima M.: Gap function approach to the generalized Nash equilibrium problem. J. Optim. Theory
Appl. 144, 511-531 (2010)
11. Murphy, H.F., Sherali, H.D., Soyster, A.L.: A mathematical programming approach for determining oligopolistic market
equilibrium. Mathematical Programming. 24, 92-106 (1982)
12. Muu L. D., Oettli W.: A method for minimizing a convex-concave function over a convex set. J. Optim. Theory Appl.
70, 377-384 (1990)
13. Muu, L.D.: An algorithm for solving convex programs with an additional convex-concave constraint. Mathematical
Programming. 61, 75-87 (1993)
14. Muu, L.D., Nguyen, V.H., Quy, N.V.: On Nash-Cournot oligopolistic market models with concave cost functions. Journal
of Global Optimization. 41, 351-364 (2007)
15. Nagurney, A.: Network Economics: a Variational Inequality Approach. Kluwer Academic Publishers (1993)
16. Pham D.T., Le Thi H.A.: Convex Analysis approach to DC prohramming: Theory, algorithms and applications. Acta
Math. Vietnam. 22, 289-355 (1997)
17. Quoc T.D., Muu L.D.: A spritting proximal point method for Nash-Cournot equilibrium models involving nonconvex
cost functions. J. Nonlinear and Convex Analysis 12, 519-534 (2011)
18. Rockafellar, R.T.: Convex Analysis. Princeton University Press (1970)
19. Sun W.-Y., Sampaio R.J.B., Condido M.A.B.: Proximal point algorithm for minimization of DC function. J. Comput.
Math. 21, 451-462 (2003)
